The energy transition today.

 The year 2024 saw multiple records broken for the clean energy transition and for renewable energy in particular. Global installed capacity of renewable power increased by 585 GW, marking a record annual growth rate of 15.1% and accounting for 92.5% of power capacity additions from all sources.29 The share of clean energy sources in global electricity generation surpassed 40% for the first time, with renewables accounting for 32%.30 Meanwhile, global investments in the clean energy transition exceeded USD 2 trillion for the first time.31 (See Annex for the definitions of clean energy and renewable energy used throughout this report, and for definitions of electricity capacity and generation.) This section explores six indicators that illustrate how the clean energy transition is well underway and accelerating. Table 1 summarizes how some of the key underlying metrics have evolved since 2015, the year the Paris Agreement was adopted.

i) Cost declines of renewable power

Due to steadily improving technologies, competitive supply chains, and economies of scale, renewable energy technologies have seen spectacular cost declines since 2010, as shown in Figure ES1. As detailed in IRENA’s Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2024 report, the global weighted average levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) generated from new utility-scale solar PV was 414% higher than that from the least-cost new fossil fuel-fired option in 2010.1,vi By 2024, solar PV was 41% cheaper, averaging USD 4.3 cents/kWh. In 2010, the cost of vi See Annex for definition of LCOE. onshore wind was 23% higher than fossil fuels; by 2024, it was 53% lower, averaging USD 3.4 cents/kWh. Globally in 2024, 91% of new renewable projects offered cheaper electricity than the lowest-cost, new-build fossil fuel alternative. The significant cost reduction also extends to enabling technologies such as battery storage. Between 2010 and 2024, the costs of utility-scale battery energy storage systems for grid applications fell by 93%, from USD 2,571/ kWh in 2010 to USD 192/kWh in 2024. The abundance of renewable energy technology manufacturing capacity in China was a key driver behind their cost declines in recent years. For comparison, the 2023 global average costs of electricity generation from new coal- and gas-fired power plants were around USD 7.2 and 8.3 cents/kWh respectively, and around USD 12 cents/kWh when coupled with carbon capture and storage (CCS), while that from new nuclear power plants was USD 23.1 cents/kWh.35 In 2023, an estimated 96% of newly installed, utility-scale solar PV and onshore wind capacity had lower power generation costs than new coal and gas plants, while around 75% of new wind and solar PV plants offered cheaper power than existing fossil fuel facilities globally.40 At the national level, solar and wind power became cost-competitive with fossil fuels without financial support in many countries between 2010 and 2022. By 2022, most major markets had achieved cost parity, with most of the newly commissioned projects delivering electricity at lower costs than fossil fuel-based alternatives — this trend is shown in Figure 1 for 20 countries.

 Although comprehensive LCOE estimates for renewables coupled to battery energy storage systems remain limited, available data indicate that such systems are becoming increasingly costcompetitive with coal- and gas-fired power plants in key markets including Australia, China, the EU, India, and the United States of America (USA), and their costs are projected to continue to fall rapidly in the coming years. For example, IRENA found that in 2024, 17 operational hybrid solar-battery projects in the USA achieved average LCOE of USD 7.9 cents/ kWh, which is comparable to the midpoint of the LCOE range for combined-cycle gas turbine (CCGT) power plants (USD 7.6 cents/kWh) and below that for coal-fired power plants (USD 11.8 cents/kWh).1,43 In Australia, eight hybrid projects combining solar, wind, and battery storage reported average LCOE of USD 5.1 cents/kWh, outperforming new-build coal (USD 8.4 cents/kWh) and CCGT (USD 10.3 cents/kWh) power plants.

ii) Pace and scale of renewable energy technologies deployment

 When new power capacity is under consideration today, solar PV and onshore wind not only offer the cheapest option, but also the fastest. On average, project lead times (planning, development, and construction) for utility-scale solar PV and onshore wind take one to three years, whereas coal- and gas-fired power plants can take up to five years or more, and 10–15 years for nuclear power plants. For other renewables, small-scale solar PV systems take less than a year, while concentrated solar power (CSP), hydropower, and offshore wind projects can take up to five years or more on average. With their cost competitiveness and relatively short project lead times, solar PV and onshore wind are experiencing dramatic growth that is continuously exceeding even the most optimistic forecasts. In 2024, global installed capacity of renewable power saw a record annual growth rate of 15.1% (585 GW), with solar making up over three-quarters of this expansion (452 GW), followed by wind (113 GW).29 This is the 23rd year in a row that renewable capacity additions set a new record. Moreover, renewables also accounted for the largest share of the growths in global power generation (74%) and total energy supply (38%). As the middle panel of Figure 2 shows, each year since 2015, over 50% of global power capacity additions have come from renewables, and over 75% since 2020. In particular, solar and wind have become the fastest sources of electricity to scale up in history, with rapid growth in installed capacity on all continents. In 2024, absolute capacity additions from renewables exceeded those from fossil fuels in all regions shown in Figure 3 except for the Middle East. Nevertheless, as further discussed in Section 4, the deployment of solar and wind capacity remains highly concentrated in developed countries and in China, India, and Brazil. In 2024, the top 10 countries with the largest absolute solar capacity additions were China (278 GW), the USA (38.3 GW), India (24.5 GW), Brazil (15.2 GW), Germany (15.1 GW), Türkiye (8.6 GW), Spain (6.7 GW), Italy (6.7 GW), Australia (5.2 GW), and France (4.1 GW). Still, new solar markets are emerging rapidly in other EMDEs. For example, in the first seven months of 2024, Pakistan imported 12.5 GW of solar panels, while Saudi Arabia imported 9.7 GW. Oman, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have also increased imports recently. Meanwhile, although Africa remains the continent with the lowest share of solar and wind in the electricity mix globally, new solar installations are projected to increase by more than 40% in 2025 from 2024, when around 2 GW were added. Between 2011–2013 and 2021–2023, the annual average number of internationally-financed renewable projects increased from 42 to 127 in Africa, and from 89 to 248 in Latin America and the Caribbean.

As a result, the share of renewables in global electricity generation has increased from around 23% in 2015 to 32% in 2024 (Figure 2). For nonbiomass variable renewables, the share increased from 21% to 30%. By 2022, 61 countries generated more than 50% of electricity from non-biomass renewable sources, 31 countries more than 75%, and 15 countries more than 90% (Figure 4). In particular, solar power is surging worldwide, with 99 countries doubling the amount of electricity generation from solar energy between 2020 and 2024.30 For variable renewable sources like solar and wind, energy storage and smart grid technologies will be essential for integrating large quantities of renewable power securely and reliably. The use of digital technologies can also help to improve energy and material efficiency in end-use sectors.52 Grid-related investment in digital technologies grew by over 50% between 2015 and 2022 to USD 63 billion.53 The global battery market is also advancing rapidly as demand rises sharply and prices continue to decline. Strong growth occurred in both the power sector — for utility-scale battery projects as well as mini-grids and solar home systems — and in the transport sector as an essential component of EVs. In 2023, 42 GW of battery storage capacity was added to electricity systems worldwide. Meanwhile, sales of EVs have been rapidly growing globally, increasing by over 33 times, from 0.5 million (1% of all car sales) in 2015 to over 17 million (>20% of all car sales) in 2024. EVs now account for almost half of all car sales in China, 20% in Europe, and over 10% in the USA. Emerging markets in Asia and Latin America are becoming new centres of growth, with EV sales jumping by over 60% in 2024 to almost 600,000 — about the size of the European market in 2019. Electric car sales in 2025 are expected to exceed 20 million worldwide to represent over 25% of all cars sold. On the other hand, global progress on energy efficiency has been limited to date. In 2022, the global economy produced 2% more GDP for every unit of energy consumed compared with 2021. This formed the baseline for the goal of doubling energy efficiency agreed at COP28. However, the annual average rate of improvement between 2022 and 2024 fell to 1% a year. Meanwhile, the share of electricity in total final energy consumption only increased from 18% in 2015 to 20% in 2023. Much greater effort is needed to speed up the electrification of and energy efficiency improvements in the transport, industry, and building end-use sectors. In terms of total energy supply, fossil fuels continue to dominate the share, decreasing from 83% in 2015 to 80% in 2024 globally — with renewables accounting for 15% in 2024  In 2022, in around half of all countries fossil fuels exceeded 75% of the total energy mix (Figure 4). This is primarily for six reasons. First, given the scale and complexities of the energy system, its transformation will inevitably take time due to the slow capital-stock turnover of energy infrastructure. Second, actual progress in terms of adding or replacing energy equipment with new renewables-based technologies has thus far been confined to a few sectors (i.e. power generation and light-duty transport) and regions (i.e. the advanced economies and China). Third, as discussed above, there has been far too little progress on energy efficiency and electrification. Fourth, global energy demand has been growing, especially in EMDEs, and renewables have thus far largely added to expanding overall energy production rather than replacing fossil fuels.Fifth, new fossil fuel production and consumption projects continue to be developed and added to the global energy mix. Between 2015 and 2024, total energy supply from fossil fuels grew by 12%, and a cumulative total of 736 GW of fossil fuel-based electricity capacity was added. Finally, certain methodological accounting conventions make the share of renewables in total primary energy supply a poor indicator of their role in providing useful energy services. Section 4 further explores some of the major barriers to accelerating the transition away from fossil fuels. 

iii) Investments in the clean energy transition 

In 2016, global clean energy investments surpassed those for fossil fuels for the first time by a narrow margin of USD 34 billion; by 2024, that difference stood at USD 835 billion. Total clean energy

investments exceeded USD 2 trillion for the first time in 2024, with USD 760 billion going towards renewable power, USD 729 billion for energy efficiency and end-use, and USD 445 billion for grids and storage — albeit at high concentration in the advanced economies and China, as discussed further in Section 4. The IEA projects that clean energy investments will reach around USD 2.2 trillion in 2025, while fossil fuel investments will total USD 1.1 trillion. This means that today, for every dollar going to fossil fuels, two dollars are invested in the clean energy transition. ix Moreover, the diffusion of clean energy technologies through trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) has surged since the adoption of the Paris Agreement. Between 2014 and 2022, global clean energy FDI — primarily in renewable energy, EVs, and green hydrogen — tripled as a share of global GDP, accounting for 40% of all new announced greenfield FDI in 2022.10,60 Since 2015, the total number of international investment projects in SDG-related sectors has grown by 25%, primarily driven by renewable energy projects, underscoring their critical importance in the broader push for sustainable development. Nevertheless, the momentum is facing strong headwinds. Between 2023 and 2024, greenfield FDI in renewable energy declined by 24% to a total of around USD 267 billion.61 (See Annex for definitions of FDI and greenfield FDI.)

iv) Contributions of the clean energy sector to jobs and economic growth 

The dramatic rise in clean energy deployment means that a new clean energy economy is emerging. The sector is now powering economic development and jobs in many countries around the world. In 2024, the clean energy sector is estimated to have accounted for more than 10% of China’s economy for the first time, driving 26% of the country’s GDP growth.63 The year before, the sector added around USD 320 billion to the global economy, accounting for 10% of GDP growth globally; almost 5% in India, 6% in the USA, 20% in China, and nearly one-third in the EU.38 Clean energy jobs (direct and indirect) surpassed those from fossil fuels for the first time in 2021. In 2023, clean energy jobs grew by 1.5 million, bringing the total to 34.8 million, while jobs in the fossil fuel sector grew by 940,000 to a total of 32.6 million. Within the clean energy Mix These values are expressed in terms of real 2024 USD. sector, renewable energy jobs were estimated at 16.2 million — with 7.4 million in China, 1.8 million in the EU, 1.6 million in Brazil, just over 1 million each in India and the USA, 324,000 in Africa, and 91,000 in Oceania. Both centralized and decentralized renewable energy systems are spurring job creation. For example, in 2021 the number of people directly employed in decentralized renewable energy — used by households and commercial and industrial enterprises for both electricity and clean cooking applications — reached more than 80,000 in India (mostly in solar PV), 50,000 each in Kenya and Nigeria, almost 30,000 in Uganda, and almost 14,000 in Ethiopia.

v) Decoupling economic growth from emissions

 There are signs of a weakening link between CO2 emissions and GDP growth on a global scale. Between 2023 and 2024, the growth in energy-related CO2 emissions slowed to 0.8% while the global economy expanded by more than 3%. Clean energy technologies deployed since 2019 are helping to avoid around 2.6 billion tonnes of CO2 emissions annually (of which 87% are due to solar PV and wind power), which are roughly equivalent to annual fossil-CO2 emissions in the EU. Since the 1990s, more than 40 countries, including 15 non-OECD countries, have decoupled economic growth from GHG emissions for more than five years at least. In aggregate, advanced economies have seen CO2 emissions peaking and declining from 2007 onwards, while GDP growth has continued, even when consumption of goods manufactured overseas is accounted for. Such diverging trends of economic activity and emissions are also starting to become apparent in the African, Eurasian, and Latin American regions, as well as in China and India.

vi) Innovative mechanisms to support just energy transitions in developing countries

 Recent years have seen a proliferation of international alliances focused on various aspects of advancing a global just energy transition, as well as the emergence of innovative support mechanisms for developing countries. In particular, so-called “country platforms” — voluntary, government-led, and multi-stakeholder partnerships used to attract and coordinate international public finance in support of common goals — have the potential to serve as a powerful mechanism to accelerate country-driven, context-specific action on climate and the energy transition that aligns with national priorities. The Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) that were launched for South Africa, Indonesia, Viet Nam, and Senegal between 2021 and 2023 are one example of these country platforms — with the specific goal of accelerating the energy transition in partnership with a selected number of developing countries. As of June 2025, the International Partners Group (IPG) of donors included Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, the EU, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK), with additional private sector and public finance institution commitments coordinated through the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ). While the scope of the JETPs varies between countries, most have focused on reducing emissions from the power sector by accelerating the retirement of coal power, ramping up renewable energy deployment, and upgrading grid infrastructure to enable high renewables penetration. Notwithstanding ongoing challenges and complexities given the scale of transformation required, JETPs have been instrumental in driving country-level just energy transitions and investment planning, the setting of ambitious fossil fuel phase-down and renewable phase-in targets, and bringing together relevant stakeholders across governments and society. South-South cooperation on the clean energy transition has also been scaling up in recent years, particularly by China through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which accounted for 10–15% of international project finance deals in Sub-Saharan Africa in recent years. Furthermore, intra-regional support mechanisms also exist, such as the EU’s Just Transition Fund to support member states in their economic diversification and workforce reskilling towards net zero.